The Argentinian Invasion Plan of the Falkland Islands in 1982: Naval Dominance and Strategic Failures
The Argentinian invasion of the Falkland Islands in 1982 was a complex military operation that hinged largely on the strategic missteps and inter-service rivalries within the Argentinian Armed Forces. This article delves into the planning and execution of this operation, examining the role of the navy and the air force in the lead-up to the invasion. It also explores the backdrop of inter-army rivalries and how these factors contributed to the disastrous outcome for the Argentinian military.
Initial Intelligence and Strategic Shortcomings
The Argentinian military's initial intelligence assessment for a possible war was conducted on April 21, 1982, just 19 days after the recovery of any form of strategic planning. This assessment marked the first serious effort by the Strategic Planning Board (JEB) to formulate a plan. However, the lack of coordination between the different branches of the military—a situation exacerbated by the absence of a unified command structure—hampered the effectiveness of this assessment.
Inter-Service Rivalry
The navy and air force vied for control over the invasion plan, each attempting to outmaneuver the other. The Army's General Galtieri, along with his counterparts from the air force and navy, were tasked with supporting each other's efforts. The navy emerged victorious by promising the Army a prominent role in taking control of Government House, whereas the air force was relegated to merely bringing up supplies.
The Army's representative, Colonel Seineldin and 25 men from the 25th Infantry Regiment (IR25), were assigned to guard the air port rather than proceed to Government House. The navy knew they would face significant resistance from the British Royal Marines and hence opted for a more cautious approach. The air force's plan to simply land everyone on the air strip was blocked, as a result of which their plan was rendered ineffective.
Invasion Planning and Execution
The naval forces were responsible for the actual planning and execution of the invasion. Despite the sophistication of the plan, there were several critical issues that emerged. A detailed landing plan led to heavy casualties, with an LVTP-7 Amtrack being blown up fully loaded and an LCVP Landing Craft sunk from both the south and the north. These incidents were quickly covered up by the navy to minimize embarrassment and mitigate the casualties.
Inter-Army Rivalries and Political Factors
The inter-army rivalries of the 1960s had a significant impact on the planning and execution of the invasion. The divide between what was termed the "Blues and Reds" factions—representing the traditional wealthy elite and supporters of British/US interests versus those pushing for full independence and self-reliance—was stark. During the Falkland Island operation, these rivalries led to strategic planning that prioritized political gains over military success.
The landing in the Malvinas coincided with the start of combat operations. In 1963, units from the 8th Tank Regiment and the Navy’s F9Fs engaged in clashes, with AT-6 Texan aircraft from the Navy firing rockets into an Army vehicle formation. Additionally, Sherman Firefly tanks from the Army passed by a disabled Sherman from an Army faction aligned with the Navy. The symbolic attack on the Punta Indio Naval Air Base by the Argentine Air Force highlighted the ongoing tensions between the different branches of the military.
Overall, the Argentinian invasion of the Falkland Islands in 1982 was a case of strategic missteps and inter-service rivalries leading to a catastrophic failure. The uneven planning, limited coordination, and political motivations all contributed to the disastrous outcome for the Argentinian military. This historical analysis provides valuable insights into the importance of inter-service cooperation and strategic planning in modern military operations.